BEARdocs

A shirking model of NBA players.

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Kelly, Thomas M.
dc.contributor.author Francis, Rashad J.
dc.contributor.other Baylor University. Dept. of Economics. en
dc.date.copyright 2006-08-03
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2104/4853
dc.description.abstract As guaranteed National Basketball Association (NBA) contract salary amounts continuously increase there is a strong possibility of shirking due to difficulty in modeling contracts based upon future performance. Based on a 5-year panel of 121 NBA players this paper uses two stage least squares regression to test the possibility of player shirking by comparing performance in the final year of their contract versus other years. The analysis does not find evidence of shirking, although it does find evidence that player performance is significantly affected by individual characteristics, such as age, experience, and salary. The general conclusion of the study is that competitiveness in the market for NBA players is the primary determinant of player performance rather than attempts by players to consciously affect contract outcomes by selectively altering their performance. en
dc.rights Baylor University theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission. en
dc.subject Wages -- Mathematical models. en
dc.subject Collective bargaining. en
dc.subject Professional sports contracts. en
dc.subject Behavioral assessment. en
dc.title A shirking model of NBA players. en
dc.type Thesis en
dc.description.degree M.S. en
dc.rights.accessrights Worldwide access en
dc.contributor.department Economics. en


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search BEARdocs


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account

Statistics